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Abstract
The European integration process has removed barriers to trade within Europe. We ana-
lyze which integration step has most profoundly inﬂuenced the trending behavior of ex-
port openness. We endogenously determine the single most decisive break in the trend, ac-
count for strong cross-country heterogeneity and propose a new measure for the strength
of trend breaks. Highly open economies gain from both, monetary and real integration.
In sharp contrast, less open economies do not beneﬁt from real integration and even suf-
fer from monetary integration. The major milestones for France, Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands are the Euro introduction, the Maastricht Treaty, the Exchange Rate Mecha-
nism I and the merge of EFTA and EEC to the European Economic Area, respectively. Our
empirical results have important implications for inner-European economic development,
as export openness feeds back into growth, unemployment and income convergence.
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11 Motivation
Exportopennessmeasuresacountry’sde-factointegrationintheworldeconomy, which
exhibits ample effects: It might stimulate economic growth (Frankel and Romer 1999,
Buch and Toubal 2009, Felbermayr et al. 2010), reduce unemployment (Dutt et al.
2009, Felbermayr et al. 2009) or raise productivity (Alcal´ a and Ciccone 2004). More-
over, both the factor-price-equalization theorem in a Heckscher-Ohlin world, as well as
extensions to Solow’s growth model advocate that trade liberalization fosters conver-
gence (see Ben-David 1996 for a detailed discussion). Empirically, Ben-David (1993)
ﬁnds evidence for this link between income convergence and openness in the Euro-
pean Economic Community (see Slaughter 2001 for a summary of related empirical
literature; compare Ben-David 2001 for a comment).
In light of the goal to boost inner-European trade and thereby to strengthen economic
ties - for its own merit and for the sake of political and economic stability - the stepwise
removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade within Europe may have affected ex-
port openness fundamentally. Export openness generally exhibits a time trend. Events
of European integration may have fundamentally changed this trend: Sequentially,
separating economic, political and institutional walls have been torn down starting
out with the Treaty of Rome 1957. Early economic integration steps have established a
customs union in 1968, paved the way to monetary integration via the Exchange Rate
Mechanism I 1979, and conﬁrmed the intention to build a uniﬁed Europe in periods
of skepticism like the Single European Act 1986. Later, the Maastricht Treaty 1992 has
founded the European Union, the common market has been extended with the estab-
lishment of the European Economic Area 1994. Finally, the Euro has been launched as
common currency in 1999. Moreover, several waves of enlargement have taken place,
the latest being the entry of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. A priori, it is not clear
which event has most crucially affected export openness in Europe.
Our main contribution is to take a bird’s eye view on the major steps of European
integration and to analyze which milestone brings about the most crucial structural
change in export openness of France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Inspired by
2the seminal work of Ben-David and Papell (1997) on trend breaks in openness, we en-
dogenously determine the single most decisive break in the trend function. We accom-
modate country-pair speciﬁc trending behavior and heterogeneous effects of European
policy on exports.
We apply a state-of-the-art testing procedure proposed by Perron and Yabu (2009). The
testing procedure is custom-tailored to our needs: First, the test is valid in the case of
stationarity or non-stationarity of openness. As our empirical results conﬁrm, both
cases are relevant. Thus, the test outcome is not inﬂuenced by pre-tests or unrealis-
tic assumptions. Secondly, the test proves to be powerful, while exhibiting good size
properties also in small samples, see Perron and Yabu (2009).
In order to assess the major milestone for openness, we propose a new and simple
measure for the strength of a trend break. This measure remedies shortcomings of
competing approaches. It is based on a comparison of the trend functions with and
without an estimated break. It allows us to quantify the periodical openness gain (or
loss) which is due to a structural change in the trend and thus, we are able to rank the
importance of milestones.
Section 2 outlines the core integration events and their relation to export openness.
Section 3 discusses general methodological issues. Section 4 provides a description of
the econometric methodology, while section 5 presents and discusses empirical results.
Main conclusions are drawn in section 6.
2 Major Steps of European Integration and Export Open-
ness
The Treaty of Rome 1957 establishes the European Economic Community (EEC), also
called ”Common Market”. It sets a road map to the European integration, which aims
at the foundation of a common market with free trade in goods, services and factors.
Eleven years later, in 1968, the Customs Union - a free trade area with a common tar-
iff applied to third countries - is completely established. Early evidence points to an
3increase in trade within the EEC due to the Common market, with both trade creation
due to the reduction of intra-area tariffs as well as trade diversion, i.e., a reallocation of
trade with non-members to member states (Balassa 1967).
Eleven years later, in 1979, the ERM I establishes the link of European currencies
through a semi-pegged system as the ﬁrst major step of monetary harmonization. It
is set up to path the way to a single common currency, and to bring down exchange
rate volatility within Europe and thereby to stabilize the monetary environment. Thus,
already 30 years before the ﬁnal launch of the Euro, a crucial monetary channel for a
potential openness gain is opened. Recently, Gil-Pareja et al. (2007) ﬁnd evidence for a
trade-creating effect of ERM I. According to their results, this effect occurs on top of the
trade expanding effect of exchange rate stability. They argue, that this effect is due to
anticipation of additional real integration steps yet to come. Moreover, they ﬁnd that
especially periphery countries beneﬁt from ERM, whereby the beneﬁt manifests itself
in an increased intra-EU trade volume. Using cointegration techniques, Fountas and
Aristotelous (1999) ﬁnd that growth in intra-EU trade is almost independent of the pre-
vailing exchange regime. Still, they ﬁnd that ceteris paribus trade is greater when the
exchange rate exhibits a lower volatility. Tenreyro (2007) studies the effect of exchange
rate stability on trade volumes, and ﬁnds no evidence for a trade-creating effect.
The Single European Act is the ﬁrst major revision of the Treaty of Rome in response
to the existence of considerable de-facto barriers to trade within Europe. Together, the
two demarcate the transition period of the EEC (Ben-David 1993). In light of persisting
de-facto barriers to trade within Europe, the Act’s importance derives from the con-
ﬁrmation of the member states’ conviction to form a European Union. Thus, after a
couple of years of Euro-pessimism, it increases trust among economic agents that in-
tegration steps will not be reversed but rather be extended in the future. For an early
discussion of the importance of the SEA, see McAleese and Matthews (1987).
As promoted in the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty 1992 accomplishes the common market
within Europe with the establishment of the European Union and it paves the way to
the currency union. Subsequently, in 1994, the European Economic Area is established,
allowing members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) to participate in the single
4market as established in 1993, whereby maintaining their currencies.
The most recent integration step has been the launch of Euro in 1999, which has been
set in the Maastricht Treaty. On top of the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty, the
introduction of a common currency implies substantially lower transaction cost due to
the same money used for transactions. Presumably, the Euro introduction is the most
studied among the core events, see Baldwin (2006) for a comprehensive survey. As
in one of the early studies by Micco et al. (2003), a positive effect of the Euro is the
prevalent ﬁnding. The estimated size of the effect varies substantially across studies
(Berger and Nitsch 2008, Bun and Klaasen 2007, Glick and Rose 2002; compare Rose
and Engel 2002, Rose and van Wincoop 2001 and Rose 2000). Still, as emphasized by
Berger and Nitsch (2008), the Euro effect on trade has rarely been put into perspective
with preceding integration efforts.
3 Methodological Aspects
The broad perspective we take is essential: Each of the milestones may have shaped
European export openness through the removal of barriers to trade. Limiting the view
to one event may lead to negligence of more crucial ones. In this case, empirical results
for the effect of a certain event on trade are likely to be biased. We want to explicitly
model these events if they matter and to rank the role they play in the process. Thus,
we consistently estimate the single most decisive breakpoint in export openness series.
Since the breakpoint is determined endogenously, we detect the most crucial event
which has brought about a trend break - even if it is unrelated to the European inte-
gration process. If for example, the oil crisis has triggered the most decisive structural
change in openness within Europe, this shows up in our results. This is a strength of
our approach, since the test for trend breaks and the breakpoint estimation is indepen-
dent of the number of potential breakpoints in our analysis (seven) and their location.
Clearly, our focus lies on the founding members of the EU, since they are directly af-
fected by all integration events since the Treaty of Rome. Of course, the number of
5participating countries increases with the accession waves. We do not include them
in the set of milestones, because the accession to an organization is different from a
modiﬁcation of the organization itself. Still, as our approach is independent of the
speciﬁcation of the events and our sample comprises the founding members’ exports
to EU-27 countries, the accession waves are allowed to matter.
Our testing procedure does not allow to draw conclusions on what caused the struc-
tural change in the trend, which is a typical feature of a structural break analysis (com-
pare Ben-David and Papell 1997, Koˇ cenda 2005 among many others). For this reason,
we use a control group to assess whether the association of breaks with EU events
indeed reﬂects EU policy and not general changes in the economic environment. A
good control group should be characterized by a substantial amount of exports to EU-
27 countries, and share the conjectured exposition to global economic trends. This
makes the US an appropriate control group. Our choice is supported by an argument
of Serlenga and Shin (2007) who use the US reference variables to capture observable
common time speciﬁc factors explaining within-EU trade.
Our object of interest is multilateral openness within Europe. Still, we want to ac-
count for the heterogeneity of bilateral trade relations since their trending behavior is
pair-speciﬁc (compare Bun and Klaasen 2007). Micco et al. (2003) ﬁnd considerable
variation of the effect of the Euro on participating countries; a priori, there is no rea-
son to assume homogeneity in intensity and timing for other events either. Therefore,
inspired by Cheung and Lai (2000), we model each bilateral trade relationship indi-
vidually, and aggregate our ﬁndings to the multilateral level as described in section
5.
The data set contains bilateral export openness y
ij
t which is deﬁned as the ratio of ex-






t. Annual export data originates from the Directions of
Trade Statistics provided by the International Monetary Fund. Nominal GDP data
from the International Monetary Fund is converted in national currency to US dollar
using the periodical average exchange rate from the same source. We analyze an un-

















































































































































Figure 1: Export Openness of EU-4 countries with their major trading partners.
(72 bilateral series). As a control group, we additionally analyze US export openness.
A typical sample length is T = 58.1
Figure 1 shows export openness time series for the four exporting countries to their
major trade partner in 2008. The four plots suggest that export openness is positively
trending over time, but the trending behavior is changing. The locations, directions
and magnitudes of trend breaks are heterogeneous.
4 Econometric Approach
This section deals with the Wald-type test for trend breaks suggested by Perron and
Yabu (2009). We consider a popular trend model which contains a linear trend and al-
lows for breaks in both, the intercept and the trend slope. This speciﬁcation is common
in the related literature and has been successfully applied in modeling many economic
1Full information about the data set is available from the authors.
7time series like US real GDP, see Ben-David and Papell (1995). Moreover, it ﬁts well
with the nature of data shown in Figure 1.
The trend break model for bilateral export openness2 between countries i and j is given
by
yt = m0 + m1DUt + b0t + b1DTt + ut (1)
with DUt = 1(t > TB) being a step dummy and DTt = 1(t > TB)(t ¡ TB) being a
trend dummy. This speciﬁcation permits a simultaneous change in the intercept and
the slope of the trend at the breakpoint TB = int(lT). The intercept changes from m0
to m0 + m1 while the trend slope changes from b0 to b0 + b1. The relative breakpoint l
is restricted to be an element of the interval L = fl; e · l · 1¡eg. Common choices
for the trimming parameter e are values between 0.01 and 0.20. In our application,
we specify e = 0.05 since our sample size is small. We aim to avoid power losses
from specifying the value of e too low, therefore e = 0.05 is a reasonable compromise.
This means for a case of T = 58 where annual data ranges from 1951 to 2008 that the
interval of potential breakpointsis given by (1954,2005) whichis largeenough in order
to cover the major events of European integration and small enough to maintain good
power.
The null hypothesis of no trend break is given by H0 : m1 = 0, b1 = 0. Hence, under the
validity of the Null, yt is modeled by a linear trend m0 + b0t with noise ut. The noise
process is allowed to be autocorrelated and even non-stationary. Moreover, the testing
procedure suggested by Perron and Yabu (2009) does not even require the knowledge
of the degree of integration of ut. It is well known that the limiting distribution of test
statistics differ with the degree of integration of ut in general. The test by Perron and
Yabu (2009) is robust in both cases, that is ut » I(0) and ut » I(1), in the sense that the
test is correctly sized and powerful in both situations. Therefore, reliable inference can
be conducted by using this test.
For a given breakpoint TB, the test for the null hypothesis is carried out in a ﬁve-step
procedure: As a ﬁrst step, the parameters of the trend model are estimated by OLS.
2The ij superscript is omitted to increase the readability.
8The residuals b ut can therefore be interpreted as de-trended data. In order to estimate
the persistence in the residual series, which is measured as the sum of autoregressive
coefﬁcients, the autoregression




riDb ut¡i + et (2)
is considered as a second step. Here, a represents the sum of autoregressive coefﬁ-
cients. The lag length k is chosen using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) with
a maximal value of kmax = int(4(T/100)1/4). Since the estimate of a can be heavily bi-
ased in small samples, the bias-correction method suggested by Roy and Fuller (2001)
is applied as a third step. This procedure leads to an approximately median-unbiased
estimate of a, see Roy and Fuller (2001).
Once the persistence of the residual series b ut is estimated, a truncation is applied in
order to make the estimator for a super-efﬁcient in step four. This truncation has the
general form
b aS = b a ¢ 1
³




Tdjb a ¡ 1j · d
´
with d 2 (0,1) and positive d. If b a is in a T¡d neighborhood of 1, then it is assigned
a value of one. As suggested by Perron and Yabu (2009), we specify d = 1/2 and
d = 1. Since the super-efﬁcient estimator will be based on the bias-correction in our
applications (b aM), it is denoted and deﬁned as
b aMS = b aM ¢ 1
³




jb aM ¡ 1j · T¡1/2
´
. (3)
This truncation bridges the gap between I(0) and I(1) noise and ensures that the test
for H0 has approximately the same limiting distribution in both cases.
The ﬁfth step applies a quasi feasible GLS (QFGLS) estimator to the speciﬁed trend
model from the ﬁrst step. The trend break model (1) is considered with regressors
xt = (1,DUt,t,DTt)0 and parameters Y = (m0,m1, b0, b1)0: yt = x0
tY + ut . The QFGLS
9regression is then given by
(1¡b aMSL)yt = (1¡b aMSL)x0
tY + (1¡b aMSL)ut (4)
for t = 2,...,T and y1 = x0
1Y+u1 for t = 1. L denotes the lag operator, i.e., Lzt = zt¡1.
The QFGLS estimator of the trend parameters is labeled as b Y. The Wald test statistic








with X = f(1 ¡b aMSL)xtg for t = 2,...,T and X = fxtg for t = 1; b hv is an estimate of
the spectral density function at frequency zero of vt = (1¡ aL)ut capturing the nature
of the errors, I(0) or I(1). For details, see Perron and Yabu (2009). As indicated, this
Wald statistic depends on a certain value of l. Since we shall not assume a known
breakpoint, the Wald statistic W(l) is computed for a sequence of values of l 2 L.
Hence, we obtain a sequence of Wald test statistics W(l 2 L). The individual test
statistics are merged into a single statistic. As suggested by Perron and Yabu (2009),
an exponential transformation is used for this purpose, see also Andrews (1993) and













Critical values for the Exp-W test statistic are reported in Perron and Yabu (2009). The
simulation evidence therein shows that the power of test is very satisfying even in
small samples unless the break size is too small. The true and unknown breakpoint
TB is estimated by minimizing the sum of squared residuals obtained from QFGLS
regression (4). Hence, the break date estimator b TB is given by






with vt(l) = (1¡b aMS(l)L)ut(l).
10Table 1: Breaks in the Trend and Major European Integration Steps
France Germany Italy Netherlands USA
Total Number of Breaks 14 12 14 13 11
Total Event Breaks 7 7 5 10 3
1957 Treaty of Rome 2
1968 Customs Union 1
1979 ERM I 2 2
1986 SEA 2 2 3
1992 Maastricht 4
1994 EEA 1 2 3
1999 Euro 3 1 1 2 1
This table depicts the estimated break dates of export openness with respect to 18 EU-27 coun-
tries which coincide with a major European integration event allowing for §1 year deviation.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Trend Breaks in Export Openness
Wetestfortrendbreaksonanominalsigniﬁcancelevelof10%andﬁndstrongevidence
for breaks in the trend of export openness. As reported in Table 1, we ﬁnd 14 trend
breaks in French export openness, 12 in Germany, 14 in Italy, 13 in the Netherlands
and 11 in the USA. Out of these estimated 64 breaks in total, 47 are signiﬁcant even at
a 1% level and 57 on a 5% level.
Trend breaks are a prevailing feature of bilateral export openness within Europe (see
Table 1): Almost 3/4 of the analyzed 72 series exhibit a structurally changing trend
(53/72). More than half of these breaks (28/53) occur in association with the seven
major European integration steps. An estimated break is considered as associated to
an event if estimated either one year before, after or at the event date. Since no breaks
are estimated in 1993, discrimination between the Maastricht Treaty and the European
Economic Area is not of empirical concern.
As can be seen from Table 1, the picture is different across countries. In case of France,
78% of bilateral openness series exhibit (14/18) breaks. Half of these are associated
11Table 2: Estimated Non-EU Event Breaks
France Germany Italy Netherlands USA
Total 7 5 9 3 8
Accession* 2 2 2 2 0
Break with accessor± 0 0 2 1 0
1954 1974* 1955 1972*± 1955
1962 1976 1973*± 1996* 1975
1966 1989 1975 2001 1975
1971 1990 1982* 1976





This table reports estimated break dates that are not associated to major European inte-
gration steps. Asterisks indicate that at least one country accesses the EU in the respec-
tive year (§ 1 year). A circle signiﬁes that the break occurs with an accessing country (§
1 year)
with one of the seven key events of the European integration process (7/14). Next, we
brieﬂy consider the distribution of estimated breakpoints. Under uniformity of break-
points and conditional on existence of a break, the probability that a break is estimated
to coincide with one of the seven milestones is equal to 40% for a representative sam-
ple length. This benchmark for a purely random association with EU events is hit by
France (50 %), Germany (58%) and the Netherlands (77%). Italy and our control group
remain below the benchmark (36% and 27%, respectively). This implies that the results
for Italy should not be overinterpreted.
A close look at the non-associated break dates as depicted in Table 2 does not sug-
gest a systematic clustering of break dates in Germany, France and the Netherlands.
In the case of Italy, a substantial cluster can be found in the end of the 1980s. Differ-
ently, trend breaks of the US bilateral export openness cluster strongly around 1975
and in the 1980s, presumably reﬂecting effects of the ﬁrst and second oil crises. For
all four EU countries, two non-associated breaks occur at the same time of an EU en-
largement, while none are found for the US. Importantly, only for Italy and the Nether-
12Table 3: Estimated Persistence of the Noise Term
France Germany Italy Netherlands USA
I(1) 10 7 10 12 5
I(0) 4 5 4 1 6
I(0), Ave b aMS 0.59 0.46 0.57 0.65 0.57
This table shows how often the truncated and bias-corrected estimator b aMS
indicates a non-stationary I(1) or stationary I(0) noise term. For the latter
case, the average (Ave) of the estimated persistence is given. In the former
case, it equals always one.
lands, breaks occur with countries which access the EU at the break dates (UK: 1973
and Cyprus: 2003; UK: 1973).
Table 3 conﬁrms that the robust test by Perron and Yabu (2009) is indeed needed for
this data set: Bilateral export openness does not generally exhibit a stationary or a
non-stationary noise component. Thus, a unique testing approach should not impose
assumptions of (non-)stationarity on the noise term.
5.2 The Most Decisive Milestone for Multilateral Export Openness
We are interested in measuring the strength of the effect a trend break has. This enables
us to judge which milestone is most important. A possible approach would compare
the average level of export openness before and after the break as done in Ben-David
and Papell (1997). Given a trending time series with a trend break, a potential prob-
lem is the negligence of time-dependent means in each sub-sample. The means are
time-varying not only before and after the break, but also within each sub-sample. If
the time series was not trending at all, such a comparison would be admissible. Alter-
natively, one may compare the trend slope in the pre- and the post-break sub-sample,
respectively. These are given by b b0 and b b0 + b b1, respectively, see
yt = m0 + m1DUt + b0t + b1DTt + ut .
13Although this approach accounts for time-varying means, it ignores the mean shift
from b m0 to b m0 + b m1. In order to circumvent the mentioned shortcomings, we propose a
new and simple measure for the strength of trend breaks. We propose to measure the






where b et is the difference between the estimated deterministic trend under (i) a break
(B) and (ii) no break (NB) during the post-break sub-sample3, i.e.,
b et = b yB
t ¡ b yNB
t , t = b TB + 1, b TB + 2,...,T . (9)
The estimated trend function with a break is given by b yB
t = b m0 + b m1 + b b0t + b b1d DTt,
while the extrapolated trend function without a break is b yNB
t = b m0 + b b0t. The latter
is a special case of the former one (b m1 = b b1 = 0). Inserting for b yB
t and b yNB
t gives the








b m0 + b b0t
´
. (10)
The measure S can be interpreted as the cumulated differences between the actual and
the hypothetical trend function. Even though this measure is related to Balassa (1967)
as it compares the differences between actual and hypothetical values, it is not our goal
to establish a fully-ﬂedged ex-post counterfactual of export openness that would have
occurred without the considered integration step (compare Magee 2008). Instead, we
want to measure the strength of the break.
Simple (and omitted) steps of calculation allow us to write S as




T(T + 1) ¡ b TB(b TB + 1)
´
. (11)
3The trends are the same in the pre-break sub-sample.
14Table 4: Breaks in the Trend and Related Gains/Losses
France Germany Italy Netherlands USA
1957 Treaty of Rome -0.78
1968 Customs Union -0.01
1979 ERM I -5.80 0.57
1986 SEA 1.57 2.02 -4.25
1992 Maastricht 6.22
1994 EEA -0.001 4.80 5.83
1999 Euro -1.58 1.45 -0.45 2.27 -0.01
This table reports periodical gains (or losses) e Sij which are associated with a trend break. If
more than one break is associated to a milestone, compare Table 1, then the sum of e Sij is
reported.
For comparability across different pairs with potentially different break dates, we nor-
malize S by number of post-break periods such that the scaled measure, e S, can be in-




T ¡ b TB




T + b TB + 1
´
. (12)
Intuitively, S and e S can be either positive or negative, depending on the estimated
parameters b m1, b b1 and the estimated breakpoint b TB. S and e S approach zero as b m1 and
b b1 both tend to zero.4
At this stage, we calculate e Sij for bilateral trade relations ij which exhibit a trend break.
Table 4 reports the results for e Sij. If we ﬁnd more than one bilateral trade relation to
exhibit a trend break at a milestone (see Table 1), the sum of individual values of e Sij
is reported. The summation is applied in order to interpret the results at a multilateral
level. As multilateral openness is the sum of bilateral openness, summation is appro-
priate. It can be seen from Table 4 that EU events not only affect the number of export
relations differently across countries, but this heterogeneity also translates into distinct
openness gains and losses for the individual countries.
For France, the most incisive event has been the Euro introduction, and thus a mone-
4In a few rare cases a correction of S and e S is needed in order to ensure positivity of b yB
t and b yNB
t .
15tary integration step. It brings about a periodical openness loss of -1.58%. The loss
in overall periodical export openness does not result from structural changes with
France’s major trade partners (Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, Belgium), but arises from
countrieslocatedintheEuropeanperiphery, namelyIreland(-0.14%), Portugal(-1.33%)
and Cyprus (-0.11%). This ﬁnding is in line with Aristoteleous (2006) who ﬁnds a nega-
tive trade effect of the Euro in France. Empirical evidence suggests that French exports
are not responsive to exchange rate volatility (Fountas and Aristotelous, 1999). This
closes down one beneﬁcial channel of monetary integration for France, such that the
launchoftheEurohasledtoarelativedisadvantageforFrance. Moreover, thenegative
Euro effect may reﬂect what has been highlighted by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997):
France’s economic readiness for monetary integration is limited, and its participation
rather driven by political than by economic considerations.
In contrast to France, the most decisive break for Germany occurs in conjunction with
the Maastricht Treaty. The effect is large and positive amounting to 6.22%. Not sur-
prisingly due to the prominent role in the integration process, the geographical loca-
tion and its long tradition as exporting economy, Germany is the main beneﬁciary of
the most comprehensive integration step. The openness gain results from trade with
Austria (2.89%), France (-0.20%), Italy (1.03%) and Spain (2.50%). Notably, all four
countries driving the openness gain belong to the top ten German export destinations.
However, the break in the bilateral openness with Austria may be also be attributed
to the German Reuniﬁcation as both countries share the same language and have an
intensive trade relation.
The outstanding event shaping Italian export openness is the ERM I. The effect is neg-
ative and quite large: -5.80%. It fully derives from exports to other EU founding mem-
bers and participants in the ERM I, namely its most important export destination Ger-
many (-5.41%) and the Netherlands (-0.39%). The beneﬁcial effect from lower exchange
rate volatility does not manifest itself for Italy. This corresponds to Fountas and Aris-
totelous (1999): the ERM I has not fostered exports due to supply-side problems of
participating economies, restrictive ﬁscal policies and the remaining presence of trade
barriers. Still, the association of Italian export openness breaks with European integra-
16tion event is very low in general. This points to the existence of more important factors
than the European integration which drive the path of Italy’s export openness, like for
example Italian industrial restructuring taking place.
The most decisive event for Dutch export openness is the EEA bringing about a 5.83%
periodical gain. The Netherlands have strongly beneﬁted from the widening of the sin-
gle market to EFTA countries. Unsurprisingly, the increase in openness per year fully
emanates countries which are not members of the EU in 1994. It stems from former
EFTA countries, Austria (1.16%) and Finland (1.35%), as well as from Poland (3.32%).
None of these is a major export destination for the Netherlands. As Creusen and Lejour
(2009) point out, the major rise in Dutch exports originates from long-standing trade
partners as Germany, France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. Still, the most cru-
cial change due to European trade policy relates to non-traditional export destinations:
this highlights the particular ﬂexibility of the small open economy par excellence.
Importantly, empirical evidence for the control group is fundamentally different. The
Treaty of Rome stands out as the most decisive event with a minor loss of 0.78%. This
shows that the ties to events which seem to matter for four European countries are
weak. This conﬁrms our approach: If the European breaks were caused by global eco-
nomic events unrelated to European policy, they would be found in American export
openness to Europe as well, since the economic ties between the USA and Europe are
strong.
Across events, France does neither beneﬁt nor lose from European integration: Its
largest loss from the Euro is almost entirely compensated by the Single European Act.
In particular, France does not beneﬁt from real integration steps undertaken in the
1990s. On the contrary, Germany’s openness enjoys substantial gains in this decade
from all milestones. However, the gains arising from real integration are larger. Dif-
ferently, in the 1990s, Italian openness loses its connection to the European integration
process reﬂecting the uncertainty to participate in the EMU. Similarly to Germany, the
Netherlands strongly beneﬁt from EEA and the Euro introduction, but they suffer from
the previously installed SEA.
17Early integration steps do not matter. Although different in size and magnitude, SEA
is the ﬁrst milestone which hits all countries except of Germany. On the contrary, the
Treaty of Maastricht affects only Germany. This is the strongest effect we ﬁnd overall.
Not only do the Netherlands strongly beneﬁt from the EEA, but also does their neigh-
bor Germany. ERM I only hits Italy. Most importantly, we now compare the effect of
the Euro introduction on export openness: Notably, for no other country than France,
the Euro has most decisively shaped the long-term trend of export openness. On top of
this, when compared to the gains and losses for the major event in the other three Eu-
ropean countries, the effect of the Euro introduction is the smallest in absolute value.
This supports the main ﬁnding by Berger and Nitsch (2008) of no positive signiﬁcant
effect of the common European currency on exports which prevails on top of the pre-
ceding and continuing trade liberalization, economic harmonization and stabilization.
More open countries, Germany and the Netherlands, beneﬁt from real integration,
whereas the less integrated ones, France and Italy, do not. On top of this, they in-
cur losses in export openness from monetary integration. In sharp, both, Germany and
the Netherlands also beneﬁt from the common currency and do not lose from ERM I.
This highlights a certain structure: The main beneﬁciaries of both, monetary and real
integration, are highly open economies. Our results reveal that the existence of a com-
mon long-run trend in European export openness is highly questionable. The distinct
trends indicate divergence of inner-European export openness, which feeds back into
economic growth and unemployment, thereby increasing inner-European disparities.
The long-run aim of the European Union is to promote balanced economic and so-
cial development. The different trending behavior is not supportive or may be even
counterproductive.
6 Conclusion
Our paper provides an answer to the following question: Which European integration
event has most decisively shaped the trend of export openness of France, Italy, Ger-
many and the Netherlands? This question derives its importance from the feedback
18that export openness has on economic growth and unemployment in the individual
countries and Europe as a whole. The long time span of the European integration pro-
cess advocates a bird’s eye view on different monetary and real integration steps. To
this end, we apply a recently proposed test for trend breaks by Perron and Yabu (2009)
and endogenously determine the single most decisive breakpoint.
We ﬁnd strong evidence for trend breaks. A new and simple measure for their strength
is introduced. We ﬁnd four distinct country-speciﬁc most incisive milestones. Their ef-
fects differ in size and sign: Highly open economies gain from both, monetary and real
integration. In sharp contrast, less open economies do not beneﬁt from real integration
and even suffer from monetary integration. These distinct trends in export openness
may dangerously foster inner-European disparities in employment and growth.
The launch of the common currency is the most analyzed milestone. However, the
Euro triggers the most decisive change only for France. Moreover, it is the least im-
portant event across the four major milestones. Therefore, the ERM I, the Maastricht
Treaty and the merge of EFTA and EEC deserve at least as much research attention as
the Euro introduction.
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